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Navigating Rough Seas: Women on Waves’ Legal
Options for Overcoming Resistant States
Jennifer Bisgaier ∗

Abstract
Women on Waves is a Dutch nonprofit that seeks to provide women with safe abortion
services and health information, as well as to raise public awareness of countries with restrictive
abortion laws. One of the means through which the group achieves these goals is its ship
campaigns, in which Women on Waves sails a ship to the harbor of a country with restrictive
laws, and then brings local women out to international waters to give them medical abortion pills.
In 2017, Guatemala expelled the group’s ship from its dock before it had the chance to fulfill its
mission, claiming that Women on Waves represented a threat to public order and security. This
Comment examines possible legal actions that Women on Waves and/or Guatemalan women
could pursue against Guatemala following this incident, including claims based on violations of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and/or the American Convention on
Human Rights, as well as the right to innocent passage in the law of the sea.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
The morning of Wednesday, February 22, 2017, a 36-foot sailboat docked at
the Marina Pez Vela harbor in San Jose, Guatemala. The boat was navigated by
Women on Waves, a nonprofit dedicated to preventing unsafe abortions. 1
Founded in 1999 by Dutch physician Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, Women on Waves
seeks to provide abortion services to women living in countries with restrictive
abortion laws. 2 Women on Waves achieves this goal in part through its ship
campaigns. During a ship campaign, the group sails women twelve miles off the
coastline to international waters to give them medical abortion pills. Because the
ship is registered in the Netherlands and has a permit from the Dutch Ministry of
Health, 3 Dutch law applies when the ship is in international waters. 4
During Women on Waves’ trip to Guatemala, however, impediments quickly
emerged. Within twenty-four hours of the ship’s docking, the Guatemalan army
blocked the pier, preventing ships from entering or leaving the port. At a press
conference, the military stated that President Jimmy Morales had instructed it to
prevent Women on Waves from entering international waters. 5 Over the next few
days, the army forbade the ship’s crew members from leaving the pier for any
reason, even to obtain additional food and water. The army ultimately allowed
crew members to use the bathroom (only if escorted by ten guards) after outcry
from human rights organizations. 6 Around midnight on Friday, Guatemalan
Immigration informed Women on Waves that it would expel the ship for violating
public order, national interest, and state security. 7 The ship departed the following
evening on Saturday, February 25, 2017.
Guatemala is not the first country to challenge Women on Waves. Since its
founding, the group has faced backlash on several of its ship campaigns. To date,
the group has sent its boats to seven countries: Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Morocco, Guatemala, and Mexico. 8 In its initial voyage to Ireland in 2001, Women
on Waves was forced to cut the mission short for failure to obtain proper Dutch

1

2

3

See Edgar Calderon, The Guatemalan Navy Has ‘Detained’ a Dutch ‘Abortion Ship’ After Protests, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://perma.cc/94SM-BVWA.
Restrictive abortion laws include laws that either ban abortion entirely or permit abortion only in
cases such as rape, incest, risk to the woman, and/or fetal problems.
See Who Are We?, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/NP93-5MR9.

4

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].

5

Abortion Ship in Guatemala, February 2017, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/62JM-6GFT.
Id.

6
7
8

Id.
Abortion Ship Campaigns, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/7LVC-NF5Q.
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abortion licensing. 9 In 2004, Portuguese naval warships blocked Women on
Waves from entering the country’s territorial waters. Five years later, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Portugal violated Article
10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), freedom of
expression, by interfering with Women on Waves’ mission. 10 In 2012, Morocco’s
navy prevented Women on Waves from docking. 11
To gain visibility on an international scale, Women on Waves must have the
ability to enter countries’ territorial waters. If states were able to get ahead of
Women on Waves’ strategy and prevent its ship from docking at all, the results
could be devastating for the nonprofit. This Comment analyzes whether states
have the authority to restrict Women on Waves from entering their national
waters. This Comment will also assess whether states have the authority to prevent
Guatemalan women from accessing the group’s resources and information. This
issue is relevant today as numerous countries continue to limit women’s access to
abortion, and Women on Waves offers a highly creative solution to provide
women with care and raise awareness. Given Women on Waves’ recent trips to
Guatemala and Mexico, as well as the persistence of restrictive abortion laws
throughout Latin America, this Comment focuses on that region in assessing
Women on Waves’ legal options. This Comment will explore if Women on Waves’
legal battles are best fought by focusing on the organization’s rights to freedom
of expression and innocent passage, rather than women’s rights in general.
While previous scholarly work has analyzed Women on Waves’ ship
campaigns, these articles focused on earlier campaigns in Europe and emphasized
recourse that the group could take through the law of the sea. 12 This Comment
explores issues that have yet to be addressed by the scholarship, such as how the
9

10

Sara Corbett, The Pro-Choice Extremist, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 26, 2001), http://perma.cc/YKV4QA87.
See Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, No. 31276/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).

11

Abortion Campaigners’ Boat Turned Away from Moroccan Port, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://perma.cc/Y6PV-CRNF.

12

Three articles from the early 2000s analyze the legality of Women on Waves’ mission following its
unsuccessful attempt to visit Ireland in 2001. One of these articles assesses whether Women on
Waves’ ship campaigns are consistent with European Community law. See generally Allison M.
Clifford, Abortion in International Waters Off the Coast of Ireland: Avoiding a Collision between Irish Moral
Sovereignty and the European Community, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 385 (2002). The other two articles ask
whether coastal states may assert jurisdiction over their nationals on Women on Waves’ boat in
international waters. See generally Shannon Renton Wolf, Note, Making Waves: Circumventing Domestic
Law on the High Seas, 14 HASTING WOMEN’S L.J. 109 (2003); Adam Newman, Abortions on the High
Seas: Can the Coastal State Invoke its Criminal Jurisdiction to Stop Them?, 17 OCEAN Y.B. 512 (2003).
Additionally, two articles from the mid-2000s discuss Women on Waves’ 2003 trip to Poland as
part of a broader analysis of abortion and women’s rights in Poland. See Alicia Czerwinski, Sex,
Politics, and Religion: The Clash Between Poland the European Union over Abortion, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 653, 653–54 (2004); Danielle Nappi, Note, Demokracja and Aborcja: Poland’s New Democracy and
the Tyranny of Women’s Human Rights, 26 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 53, 65–69 (2005).
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Inter-American System would treat Women on Waves, and whether invoking the
human rights of local women—in addition to those of the organization—would
impact litigation.
This Comment is divided into six Sections. Section II discusses background
information on Women on Waves, including its mission and various campaigns
to get women access to abortion pills and information. Next, Section III describes
potential human rights that Guatemalan women could invoke to gain access to
Women on Waves’ services and information, in particular rights related to
reproduction, the right to access information, and the right to freedom of
movement. Section IV analyzes two possible rights that Women on Waves itself
could rely upon: the right to freedom of expression under international human
rights legal instruments and the right of innocent passage under the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Lastly, Section V outlines potential
causes of action that local women and Women on Waves could bring against
Guatemala. The Comment concludes by noting the nonprofit’s best options and
highlighting the importance of forum selection in ensuring Women on Waves can
continue to make these sorts of trips.

II. W OMEN ON W AVES ’ M IS SION
Women on Waves’ mission is twofold: 1) to provide women with
information (through trainings, workshops, hotlines, and apps) as well as access
to safe early-term abortions; and 2) to raise public awareness regarding countries’
restrictive abortion laws. 13 Women on Waves’ legal problems may not be entirely
negative for the group.
The group has been extremely creative in its approach to the first goal. In
addition to its ship campaigns, Women on Waves has also employed advanced
technology, including drones and robots, to deliver abortion pills to women in
countries with restrictive abortion laws. In 2015, the nonprofit successfully
completed its first “Abortion Drone” campaign in Poland, near the German
border. Though German police quickly confiscated the drone controllers, two
Polish women were able to access the pills. 14 In 2018, Women on Waves used a
robot, operated remotely from the Netherlands, to deliver pills in Northern
Ireland, enabling three women to swallow the pill before Irish police “arrested”
the robots. 15
13

Who Are We?, supra note 3 (“Women on Waves wants to respond to an urgent medical need and
draw public attention to the consequences of unwanted pregnancy and illegal abortion.”).

14

See First Flight Abortion Drone, Poland 2015, WOMEN
NPKF.

15

Abortion Robot Delivered Abortion Pills to 3 Women in Belfast, WOMEN
http://perma.cc/CGE5-VHWK.
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Beyond the dramatic ship, drone, and robot campaigns, which garner the
most media attention, Women on Waves also provides healthcare information to
women. It often operates hotlines for the women in countries that it visits, as well
many other countries. 16 The group has also conducted on-site trainings on using
the drug misoprostol to safely induce abortion in a number of countries. 17
Additionally, Women on Waves’ website features numerous resources, and the
group founded a separate organization, Women on Web, devoted specifically to
providing information online about how to safely access abortion. 18 Several
countries, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have blocked the website. 19 States’
refusal to allow Women on Waves to dock its boat, operate its technology, and
run its hotlines and websites within their borders is clearly hurting these efforts.
However, while countries’ resistance to the ship and technology campaigns
are detrimental for Women on Waves’ first objective, the backlash very much
supports the group’s second objective. In fact, in recapping its trip to Guatemala,
Women on Waves noted the extensive international press coverage as a major
accomplishment. 20 Additionally, the local press coverage almost certainly helped
Women on Waves to better advertise its hotline services; over sixty women called
the hotline in just two days. 21
Several countries have changed their abortion laws following Women on
Waves campaigns combined with other political and social organizing efforts. For
example, Portugal legalized abortion two and half years after Women on Waves’
mission, while Spain liberalized its abortion laws two years after Women on
Waves’ visit. 22 In March 2018, Dr. Gomperts told Politico, “[t]o change people’s
opinions, you have to make visible the legal realities.” 23

III. R IGHTS OF G UATEMALAN W OMEN
This Section focuses on three types of rights under international law that
Guatemalan women could raise in bringing claims against Guatemala:
reproductive rights, the right to access information, and the right to leave.
Guatemalan women could pursue legal action either through the U.N. or the
16
17

See Safe Abortion Hotlines, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/TWU4-VYAD.
See Training & Advocacy, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/C93M-UN8F.

18

See Resources, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/CPH7-5FXB; Women on Web Website is Blocked?,
WOMEN ON WAVES, http://perma.cc/DL4C-HF9V.

19

See Women on Web Website is Blocked?, supra note 19.
See Abortion Ship in Guatemala, supra note 5.

20
21
22

23

See id.
See Jillian Deutsch, The Doctor Who Brought Abortion out of the Shadows in Ireland, POLITICO (Mar. 20,
2018), http://perma.cc/W5J8-9WL3.
Id.
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Inter-American System (the human rights system of the Organization of
American States (OAS)). The U.N. has a wide array of legal instruments pertaining
to these rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the U.N.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)). 24
The Inter-American System features two predominant human rights agreements:
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration) and the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention).

A. Reproductive Rights
Reproductive rights are entangled in complex legal issues, in particular
determining when life begins. Reproductive rights also connect to a wide range of
other rights including the right to privacy, health, human dignity, access to
information, and life. The legal definition of the beginning of life varies depending
on the international organization and international agreement. This subsection will
cover legal instruments in both the U.N. and the Inter-American System. Within
the U.N., the UDHR serves as the foundational document for human rights
standards, and several subsequent treaties—detailed below—have elaborated on
those standards. Within the Inter-American System, the American Declaration
and the American Convention both describe human rights standards for the
region. While the two agreements are generally consistent, there are some notable
discrepancies pertaining to the start of life.

1. The U.N.’s approach to reproductive rights has expanded, but the
right to abortion remains qualified.
The UDHR, adopted by the U.N. in 1948, states, “All human beings are
born free and equal.” 25 Though the UDHR is not legally binding, it does establish
internationally recognizable values pertaining to human rights. 26

24

25
26

The UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR together form the International Bill of Human Rights. While
the UDHR sets forth general aspirational principles, some of which are considered customary law,
the ICCPR and ICESCR each define specific rights and limitations. CEDAW, which was adopted
over a decade after the ICCPR and ICESCR, is considered to be an international bill of rights for
women. While a large number of states have ratified all four agreements, there is some variation.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948).
See What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
http://perma.cc/BYQ7-RUQ9.
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a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) grants
rights that are tied to reproductive health.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), which interprets and
enforces the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found
a human right to abortion when the pregnancy endangers the life of the woman
or there is a fatal fetal defect. 27 For instance, in 2005, the UNHRC held that Peru
violated the ICCPR by denying a seventeen-year-old girl (named K.L.) an abortion
when she was found to have a life-threatening pregnancy due to the fetus
possessing a fetal anomaly. 28 Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR legally binds the states
that ratify it. 29 The UNHRC held that Peru violated Articles 2 (state obligations to
ensure citizens’ rights), 3 (equal rights of men and women), 6 (right to life), 7
(prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment), 17 (right to privacy), 24 (rights
of children), and 26 (prohibition against discrimination) of the ICCPR. 30
In 2016, the UNHRC ruled in Mellet v. Ireland 31 that Ireland’s abortion law
violated the ICCPR because it banned abortion in cases of fatal fetal
abnormalities. 32 The opinion emphasized women’s right to obtain information.
Ireland had passed the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for
Termination of Pregnancies) Act in 1995. 33 This Act provided very particular
circumstances in which counselors and health providers could give women
information on abortion. For example, the Act prohibited the provision of any
written materials unless specifically requested by the woman. The plaintiff, an Irish
citizen named Amanda Jane Mellet, found out twenty-one weeks into her
pregnancy that her fetus had congenital heart defects and would die shortly before
or after birth. Both the doctor and the midwife in the Irish hospital simply told
Mellet that she would have to travel for an abortion. They did not provide any
referral services. Mellet travelled to the U.K. to terminate her pregnancy and was
unable to receive aftercare or bereavement counseling upon her return to Ireland.
The UNHRC found that Ireland’s law violated Article 19 of the ICCPR,
concerning freedom of opinion and expression, stating:
27

28

29
30
31

32
33

These types of abortions, in which the procedure is performed only out of medical necessity due to
either potential harm to the woman or unviability of the fetus, are known as therapeutic abortions.
K.L. v. Peru, Comm. No. 1153/2003, Adoption of Views, (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 22, 2005),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003.
Most Central and South American states, including Guatemala, have ratified the ICCPR.
K.L. v. Peru, supra, note 28, at ¶ 3.
Mellet v. Ireland, Comm. No. 2324/2013, Adoption of Views, (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 17,
2016), U.N. Doc. CCPR/116/D/2324/2013.
See id.
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Act
1995 (Act No. 5/1995) (Ir.), http://perma.cc/6JL8-T2K5.
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The violation of her right to access sexual and reproductive health
information was inflicted because she was a woman in need of terminating
her pregnancy. Male patients in Ireland are not similarly denied critical health
information and are not pushed out and abandoned by the health care system
when requiring such information. 34

Most prominently, on October 30, 2018, the UNHRC issued the General
Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the ICCPR, the Right to Life. This Comment
was the culmination of a lengthy three-year drafting process. It employs language
similar to the terms used in the Mellet case, stating in paragraph 9:
Although States parties may adopt measures designed to regulate
terminations of pregnancy, such measures must not result in violation of the
right to life of a pregnant woman. . . . States parties must provide safe access to
abortion to protect the life and health of pregnant women, and in situations in which carrying
a pregnancy to term would cause the woman substantial pain or suffering, most notably
where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest or when the foetus suffers from fatal
impairment.. . . . States parties [may not] introduce humiliating or unreasonably
burdensome requirements on women seeking to undergo abortion. The duty
to protect the lives of women against the health risks associated with unsafe
abortions requires States parties to ensure access for women and men, and, in particular,
adolescents, to information and education about reproductive options, and to a wide range
of contraceptive methods. 35

General Comment No. 36 is meant to provide guidelines for states so that
they can comply fully with the rights listed in Article 6. 36 In paragraph 9, the
UNHRC greatly expanded state obligations to protect reproductive rights. Thus
far, countries’ reactions have been predictably mixed. Several countries had
submitted feedback on the 2017 draft. Malta, Poland, and Russia all rejected the
findings of the General Comment, claiming there is no right to abortion under the
ICCPR. 37 The U.S. stated that the “committee provides little or no authoritative
legal support or treaty analysis grounded in established rules of treaty
interpretation under international law to support many of its positions.” 38 Other
34
35

Regulation of Information Act, supra note 33, at 6.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018)
(emphasis added).

36

See Human Rights Committee Developing New Right to Life General Comment, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
RESOURCE CENTER (July 28, 2015) http://perma.cc/2WX8-J8KG.

37

See Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta, Draft General Comment on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Right to Life (2017); see also Republic of
Poland, Remarks of Poland to the General Comment No 36 on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life (2017); see also Russian Federation,
Preliminary Comments on the Draft General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 (Right to Life) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 7 (2017).

38

United States of America, Observations of the United States of America on the Human Rights
Committee’s Draft General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 – Right to Life, ¶ 3 (Oct. 6, 2017).
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countries were more positive about the General Comment and its groundbreaking
perspective on reproductive rights. For example, the U.K. wrote that it is
“generally supportive of paragraph 9.” 39 Even more enthusiastic, the Netherlands
wrote that it “welcomes” the views stated in paragraph 9. 40 Ultimately, General
Comment No. 36 serves solely as a guiding document; each state and region is still
permitted to enact its own rules. While the UNHRC has used the ICCPR to create
increasingly supportive documents on abortion rights, it has yet to enforce these
rights beyond extreme cases posing serious health dangers to the woman.
b) The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
(CEDAW) recognizes reproductive rights.
Beyond the UDHR and the ICCPR, other international instruments have
addressed women’s human rights. The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), a legally binding treaty
adopted in 1979 as an international bill of rights for women, 41 specifically
recognizes women’s reproductive rights. 42 All but five states have signed
CEDAW. Two states, including the U.S., have signed but not ratified the treaty.
CEDAW states:
State Parties shall . . . ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women . . .
[t]he same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing
of their children and to have access to the information, education and means
to enable them to exercise these rights. 43

The CEDAW Committee, which interprets CEDAW’s mandates and
monitors countries to ensure they properly implement the agreement, consists of
twenty-three women’s rights experts from countries across the world. 44 In 2011,
the CEDAW committee first analyzed abortion in L.C. v. Peru. 45 L.C., a thirteen-

39

40

41
42

43

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Human Rights
Committee Draft General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, on the Right to Life: Comments of the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 9 (Oct. 6, 2017).
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Comments of the Netherlands to the Draft General Comment No.
36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life,
¶ 7.
See Overview of the Convention, U.N. WOMEN, http://perma.cc/DF6J-N5F8.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 16(e), opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
Id.

44

See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://perma.cc/VC7R-6KT7.

45

L.C. v. Peru, Comm. No. 22/2009, Adoption of Views (U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women Nov. 25, 2011), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009.
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year-old girl, became pregnant after being raped by a thirty-four-year-old man. 46
L.C. attempted suicide, and her subsequent injuries left her at risk of becoming
permanently disabled if she continued her pregnancy. 47 The hospital’s medical
board denied L.C.’s request for an abortion. 48 L.C. ultimately miscarried and
became a permanent paraplegic. 49 The committee found that Peru violated L.C.’s
right to health, integrity, bodily autonomy, and equal treatment. 50 The committee
stated that Peru “should [] review its legislation with a view to decriminalizing
abortion when the pregnancy results from rape or sexual abuse.” 51
The CEDAW Committee has also issued inquiries to specific members
states restricting access to abortion in violation of CEDAW. However, while these
inquiries are critical of such restrictive laws, they continue to focus on therapeutic
abortions, as well as abortions in cases of rape and incest, as most critical. In its
observations of the Dominican Republic in 2013, the Committee recommended
that the state “[e]nsure that the draft amendment to the Criminal Code, which
decriminalizes abortion in cases in which the mother’s life is threatened, will be
expeditiously adopted and extended to cover other circumstances, such as rape,
incest and serious malformation of the foetus.” 52 Other committee reports make
similar specifications, including its observations on Angola, 53 Peru, 54 and (most
recently) Northern Ireland. 55 Thus, while the Committee interprets CEDAW to
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53

L.C. v. Peru, supra note 45, at ¶ 2.1.
Id. at ¶ 2.3.
Id. at ¶ 2.6.
Id. at ¶¶ 2.9, 2.11.
See generally id.
Id. at ¶ 9(b)(iii).
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the
combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of the Dominican Republic, ¶ 37(c), U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/DOM/CO/6-7 (July 30, 2013).
“Consider removing punitive legislative provisions imposed on women who undergo abortion, in
line with the Committee’s general recommendation 24 (1999) on women and health, and
broadening the conditions under which abortion can be legally available, including when pregnancy is
harmful to the mother’s health and in instances of rape and incest.” Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Angola
adopted by the Committee at its fifty fourth session, ¶ 32(g), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6
(Mar. 1, 2013) (emphasis added).

54

“[T]he Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Extend the grounds for legalization of
abortion to cases of rape, incest and severe foetal impairment; (b) Ensure the availability of abortion services
and provide women with access to high-quality post-abortion care, especially in cases of complications
resulting from unsafe abortions. . .” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Concluding observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Peru, ¶ 36, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8 (July 24, 2014) (emphasis added).
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“[The Committee] notes the great harm and suffering resulting from the physical and mental
anguish of carrying an unwanted pregnancy to full term, especially in cases of rape, incest and severe fetal
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grant broad rights to women in terms of reproductive health, it continues to
emphasize extreme scenarios such as rape, incest, and harm to woman or fetus.
c) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
interpretations recognize reproductive rights but fail to offer viable recourse.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) was adopted by the U.N. in 1966. 56 It is a legally binding document that
is implemented by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), which consists of eighteen independent experts. 57 The CESCR
performs a number of functions, including examining countries’ reports; assessing
communications from individuals claiming their ICESCR rights have been
violated; investigating grave and/or systematic violations of rights; and publishing
interpretations on ICESCR provisions (general comments). 58
Article 12 of the ICESCR states that everyone has a right “to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 59 This article has
been interpreted by the CESCR to include reproductive rights. 60 In 2016, in
General Comment No. 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, the
CESCR asserted that “[e]ssential medicines should [] be available, including . . .
medicines for abortion and for post-abortion care.” 61 The comment also calls for

56

57

58

59
60

61

impairment, in particular fatal fetal abnormality.” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, Inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under
article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 (Mar. 6, 2018)
(emphasis added). For the U.K.’s response, see Observations of the United Kingdom, Inquiry
concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8 of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/2 (Mar. 6, 2018).
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://perma.cc/4D37-KPYM.
See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Monitoring the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://perma.cc/2ZQ5-8HEN.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 56, at art. 12.
In 2000, CESCR stated that the right to health includes “the right to control one’s health and body,
including sexual and reproductive freedom.” Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 14 (2000): The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right
to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights), ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (May 2, 2016).
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“information accessibility” for all types of sexual and reproductive health,
including abortion care. 62
While the most recent General Comment is a major advancement for
international reproductive rights, it still provides little recourse for individuals
seeking justice. Unlike the ICCPR, many rights under the ICESCR are
progressively realized, meaning states are not required to demonstrate immediate
compliance, but must show meaningful progress. The “fluid” nature of these
ICESCR rights makes them unsuitable for quasi-judicial oversight. 63 This
difference was largely due to the fact that—at the time of adoption—ICESCR
rights were considered to be novel and uncodified by member states, while ICCPR
rights were widely recognized by states’ preexisting laws. 64 In 2008, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which provides
an individual complaint mechanism. 65 However, the CESCR has yet to consider
an individual complaint pertaining to abortion. Additionally, while several of the
CESCR’s concluding observations on state reports have been critical of states’
abortion laws, the criticism tends to focus on extreme cases of “when pregnancies
are life threatening or a result of rape or incest.” 66 Thus, the non-judicial oversight
provided by the CESCR, along with the quasi-judicial oversight of the CEDAW
committee and the UNHRC, demonstrate the U.N. is still unwilling to enforce an
expansive view of reproductive rights, even if treaties’ interpretations are pushing
in that direction.

2. The Inter-American System’s recognition of reproductive rights
remains limited.
The Inter-American System for protecting human rights is more constrictive
than the U.N. in terms of reproductive rights. The system, created by the
Organization of American States (OAS) and its thirty-five members, has two
62

Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 61, at ¶ 18.

63

Alexandra R. Harrington, Don’t Mind the Gap: The Rise of Individual Complaint Mechanisms within
International Human Rights Treaties, 22 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 153, 162 (2012).

64

See id.
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature Sept. 24, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117.
See, for example, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on
Nepal, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Sept. 24, 2001). See also Comm. on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Malta, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.101 (Dec.
14, 2004); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Monaco,
¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MCO/CO/1 (June 13, 2006); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Concluding Observations on Mexico, ¶¶ 25, 44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (June 9,
2006); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Chile, ¶ 53,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Dec. 1, 2004); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Concluding Observations on Kuwait, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.98 (June 7, 2004).
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central documents that pertain to these rights. The first, the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration), was adopted in 1948
and set up principles that all OAS member states agreed to follow. The American
Declaration was the world’s first-ever human rights agreement, adopted just eight
months before the U.N.’s UDHR. The Declaration states, “All men are born free
and equal.” 67 The second agreement is the American Convention on Human
Rights (also known as the Pact of San José) (American Convention), which was
adopted in 1969 and entered into force in 1978. The Convention’s provisions are
legally enforceable by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). The
American Convention states that “[e]very person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment
of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 68 The American
Convention is unique among other international human rights agreements in its
explicit recognition of life at conception. 69 While all OAS members follow the
American Declaration, only twenty-four out of the thirty-five member states have
ratified the American Convention. Most countries in Central and South America,
including Guatemala, recognize the American Convention. 70
The Inter-American System features two judicial bodies that implement
these human rights agreements: the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the IACHR. Created by the OAS in 1959, the Inter-American
Commission is a quasi-judicial body—not a court—that releases non-binding
resolutions and reports. 71 It consists of seven independent members. The
Commission aims to observe and protect human rights by monitoring OAS
member states and calling attention to human rights violations. It cannot,
however, compel state action. 72
The IACHR, on the other hand, is a court that can issue judgments involving
both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Established in 1979, the IACHR
serves both adjudicatory purposes, by hearing cases about state violations of
human rights, and advisory functions, by issuing advisory opinions on a range of
topics. The court may serve in its role as adjudicator only for countries that have

67

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Preamble, May 2, 1948,
OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 17.

68

American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
See Ligia M. De Jesus, Revisiting Baby Boy v. United States: Why the IACHR Resolution Did Not Effectively
Undermine the Inter-American System on Human Rights’ Protection of the Right to Life from Conception, 23 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 221, 223–24 (2011).

69

70

See American Convention on Human Rights Signatories and Ratifications, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, OAS, http://perma.cc/6WXR-YQWF.

71

See De Jesus, supra note 69, at 224–25.
See id. at 225–26.

72
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voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by ratifying the American Convention.
Thus, countries like the U.S. and Canada that have not recognized the Convention
are not within the IACHR’s jurisdiction. However, the court may issue advisory
opinions about any OAS member state, regardless of whether or not it has ratified
the American Convention. To bring a case before the IACHR, individuals, groups,
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must first file a petition with the
Inter-American Commission. 73
Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the IACHR
have ruled that the American Declaration should not be construed to mean that
life begins at conception. In 1981, the Inter-American Commission ruled in White
v. United States 74 (also known as the “Baby Boy case”) that legalization of voluntary
abortion is consistent with both the American Declaration and the American
Convention. 75 In this case, a seventeen-year-old girl voluntarily underwent a
procedure to abort her approximately six-month-old fetus. A jury convicted the
doctor of manslaughter, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the jury verdict. Following the reversal, Catholics for Christian Political
Action filed a petition against the U.S. and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
before the Inter-American Commission. 76 Though the Commission ruled that
neither the American Declaration nor the American Convention forbid the
legalization of abortion, the decision did not by any means create a legal right to
abortion within the Inter-American System. 77
In the years since the Baby Boy case, neither human rights body has explicitly
ruled on an unlimited right to abortion. Many abortion cases have involved
extreme scenarios featuring rape or danger to the woman. For example, in 2007,
the Inter-American Commission oversaw a settlement in which the Mexican
government admitted to violating a thirteen-year-old girl’s right to health by
denying her an abortion after she was raped. 78
The IACHR recently reaffirmed Baby Boy in 2012 in a case brought by nine
infertile Costa Rican couples seeking in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment. The
IACHR struck down Costa Rica’s ban on IVF and reaffirmed the Baby Boy case,
73
74

75

76
77
78

See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 44.
White v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 23/81,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev.1 (1980–1981).
The resolution maintained that the use of the phrase “in general” in Article 4(1) of the American
Convention demonstrates that unborn children do not have an “absolute” right to life. Id at ¶¶
19(e), 25.
See id.; see also De Jesus, supra note 69, at 231.
See De Jesus, supra note 69, at 274.
See Paulina del Carmen Ramirez Jacinto v. Mexico, Petition 161-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report. No. 21/07 (2007).
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holding that life does not begin at conception. 79 Specifically, the court stated that
“the regulatory trends in international law do not lead to the conclusion that the
embryo should be treated in the same way as a person, or that it has a right to
life.” 80 The decision focused on women’s right to privacy, stating, “The right to
private life is related to: (i) reproductive autonomy, and (ii) access to reproductive
health services, which includes the right to have access to the medical technology
necessary to exercise this right.” 81 Still, as this case focused on IVF, it did not
further elaborate on women’s abortion rights.

B. The Right to Access Information
In blocking Women on Waves’ ship, Guatemala not only stopped women
from accessing the group’s services, but also prevented them from accessing the
information that Women on Waves offered on reproduction, health, and safety.
Thus, the right to access information is relevant. Scholars often view the right to
access information as naturally connected to the right to freedom of expression. 82
After all, there is little point to expressing oneself if no one is capable of witnessing
the expression. Therefore, the rights of the audience (or the public at large) to
listen and to receive information are a crucial component of freedom of speech
and expression.
U.N. member states recognize the right to access information in several
principal documents. In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution
59(1), which states, “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right
and . . . the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the UN is consecrated.” 83
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
79

80
81
82

83

See Murillo v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Nov. 28, 2012).
Id. at ¶ 253.
Id. at ¶ 146.
See, for example, Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175 (2003).
Numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases grant the right to access information as an implicit part of the
First Amendment’s free speech clause. See, for example, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(granting Jehovah’s Witnesses the right to solicit door-to-door in part due to the homeowners’ right
to receive the pamphlets); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (emphasizing the rights of
radio listeners to hear a diversity of views); Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that consumers have a right to receive information on drug
prices). The Court has also explicitly tied the First Amendment to the right to receive information
within the context of reproductive rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (noting
the right to receive information about contraception).
G.A. Res 59 (I), at 95 (Dec. 14, 1946).
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information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” 84 In
addition to the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Article 20 of the
UDHR also grants the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 85
The right to access information relates to the right to equality and
reproductive rights, as “it is widely recognized that women cannot exercise basic
rights on an equal basis with men unless they have the information and means by
which to control their fertility.” 86 As noted above, the UNHCR has made this
connection between the right to access information and women’s reproductive
rights, ruling in Mellet that Ireland’s law limiting healthcare providers’ ability to talk
openly with patients infringed upon Irish women’s right to access information. 87
CEDAW also specifically mentions access to information as crucial for gender
equality. 88
Within the Inter-American System, Article 13 of the American Convention
grants the right to freedom of expression. 89 Though the provision does not
explicitly mention a right to access information, the IACHR has recognized such
a right as an inherent part of Article 13. In a 1985 advisory opinion, the court
emphasized how freedom of expression has a unique dual character that is both
individual and collective: individuals have the right to express themselves, while
the general public has a right to receive information and ideas. 90 The opinion
highlighted how “expression and dissemination of ideas and information are
indivisible concepts.” 91 The IACHR stated, “[f]or the average citizen it is just as
important to know the opinions of others or to have access to information
generally as is the very right to impart his own opinion.” 92 Further, it linked
freedom of information with freedom in general: “a society that is not well
informed is not a society that is truly free.” 93

84

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 25, at art. 19.

85

See id. at art. 20.
Sandra Coliver, The Right to Information Necessary for Reproductive Health and Choice under International
Law, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
INFORMATION 48 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995).

86

87
88
89
90

91

92
93

See Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 31, at ¶ 3.12.
See id. at ¶¶ 3.15, 3,18.
See American Convention of Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 13.
See Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, 25 NOVA L. REV. 411, 422 (2001).
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts.
13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 31 (Nov. 13, 1985).
Id. at ¶ 32.
Id. at ¶ 70.
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In 1994, over thirty countries from across the Western Hemisphere signed
the Declaration of Chapultepec, which elaborated on Article 13 by listing ten
fundamental principles needed to sustain a free press in a democratic society. 94
The Declaration was adopted at the Inter-American Press Association’s
Hemispheric Conference on Free Speech in Mexico City. It stated, “[e]very person
has the right to seek and receive information, express opinions and disseminate
them freely. No one may restrict or deny these rights.” 95 While the agreement is
not legally binding for its signatories, it has received growing recognition over the
past several decades since it was signed.

C. The Right to Leave
Preventing Women on Waves’ boat from fulfilling its mission also implicates
Guatemalan women’s right to leave their own country, as the state is preventing
its citizens from sailing out to international waters. The right to travel dates back
to the Magna Carta, which states in Article 42 that “[i]t shall be lawful to any
person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely,
by land or by water.” 96 More recently UDHR granted the right to leave one’s
country and return in Article 13(2). 97 Binding international documents contain
similar language, including the ICCPR in Article 12(2), 98 the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families in Article 8(1), 99 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Article 5(d)(ii). 100 For the
Inter-American System specifically, Article 22(2) of the American Convention
states that “[e]very person has the right to leave any country freely, including his
own.” 101

94

Press Release, Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), Declaration of Chapultepec is 20 Years Old
Today but It Continues as Valid as Ever, IAPA Declares (Dec. 15, 2015), http://perma.cc/BQB5-HEP5.

95

Declaration of Chapultepec, Mar. 11, 1994.
Magna Carta art. 42, June 15, 1215.
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100

101

See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 25, at art. 13(2).
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(2), 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [Hereinafter ICCPR].
See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families art. 8(1), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(d)(ii),
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 22(2).
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The UNHRC is the only international body that has expansively analyzed
the right to leave within the frame of the ICCPR. 102 While this right is often viewed
in the context of the right to emigrate to another country, it also clearly applies to
any citizen’s desire to leave his or her country for any period of time, however
brief. 103 Official commentary for the ICCPR states, “Freedom to leave the
territory of a state may not be made dependent on any specific purpose or on the
period of time the individual chooses to stay outside the country. Thus, travelling
abroad is covered, as well as departure for permanent emigration.” 104
Typically, the right to emigrate is seen as more crucial to human liberty than
the right to take shorter trips. 105 Many countries have historically deprived
emigrants—particularly minority emigrants—of their nationality. For example,
between 1955 and 1998, Greek law de-nationalized all citizens of non-Greek
descent if they left Greece “with no intent to return.” 106 In both developing and
developed countries, states have restricted people with particular skills from
leaving. 107 Countries have gone to drastic measures to restrict the right to
permanently leave a country, including passport procedures, currency regulations,
and physical barriers (most notably the Berlin Wall). 108 Thus, Women on Waves’
trips provide a unique scenario in which a very temporary travel period is essential
to realizing one’s rights.
The right to leave one’s country has a dual nature when applied to the state’s
obligations. The state has both a negative duty to not hinder departure, as well as
a positive duty to ensure its citizens are fully capable of leaving. 109 Typically the
latter obligation becomes problematic if the state fails to issue proper travel
documents, such as passports.
Article 12(3) of the ICCPR provides states with the authority to restrict
citizens’ right to leave in exceptional circumstances, including national security,
102

103

104

105

See Colin Harvey & Robert P. Barnidge, Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in
International Law, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 4 (2007).
See Dimitry Kochenov, The Right to Leave Any Country Including Your Own in International Law, 28
CONN. J. INT’L L. 43, 59–60 (2012) (“Concerning the distinctions between temporary stays abroad
and expatriation, sound consensus has emerged in the literature and official commentary that Article
12(2) ICCPR protects both equally, making no distinction between the two.”).
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 1999).
See Kochenov, supra note 103, at 60.

106

Nicholas Sitaropoulos, Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of
ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code, 6 EUR. J. MIGR. & L. 205 (2004).

107

See Rosalyn Higgins, The Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay In and Leave a Country,
49 INT’L AFFS. 341, 353–54 (1973).
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See id. at 354–55.
See Kochenov, supra note 103, at 61.
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public order, and public health and morals. 110 However, while there are cases in
which states may justifiably limit a national’s right to leave, ICCPR commentary
emphasizes that “restrictions must not impair the essence of the right.” 111 A
common example is denying a national this right for failure to perform military
service. In Lauri Peltonen v. Finland, 112 the UNHRC ruled that citizens could not
invoke the right to leave as a means to avoiding military service. 113 Another
popular justification is preventing flight when a trial is pending. 114
Still, the potential for abuse is high, especially for political dissidents. In
Samuel Lichtenszteijn v. Uruguay, 115 the UNHRC ruled that Uruguay violated Article
12 by failing to renew the passport of a Uruguayan dissident living in Mexico. 116
However, this case focuses on reentering a country, rather than leaving. The
ICCPR contains a safeguard to protect against abuses, but it similarly focuses on
reentry. In Article 12(4), the provision only states that “[n]one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country.” 117

IV. R IGHTS OF W OMEN ON W AVES
Women on Waves could pursue legal action based on its own rights as an
organization. The nonprofit successfully followed this approach in Europe.
However, litigating in the Americas would pose different challenges. This Section
explores two possible rights that Women on Waves could invoke to bring a lawsuit
against Guatemala: the human right to freedom of expression and the right to
“innocent passage” under the UNCLOS.

110

See ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 12(3). National security is concerning as a justification, because it
is difficult to limit its abuse in today’s age of terrorism and global threats. The public health and
morals justification is also highly concerning, as it enables the majority to impose its personal
viewpoints on minorities. “Principles which are not always legally enforceable but which are
accepted by a great majority of the citizens as general guidelines” could suddenly be invoked as
justification for preventing one’s freedom of movement. Kochenov, supra note 103, at 67 (quoting
Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 190 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)).
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July 29, 1994), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/492/1992.
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A. The Right to Freedom of Expression
Numerous international human rights instruments recognize a right to
freedom of expression. The UDHR states in Article 19 that “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” 118 The ICCPR contains
similar language. 119 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
articulates a right to freedom of expression in Article 10 and a right to freedom of
assembly and association in Article 11. Article 10 repeats the language of Article
19 from the UDHR verbatim and also adds:
The exercise of these freedoms may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 120

Article 11 provides the same caveat for the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association. 121

1. Women on Waves successfully sued Portugal for violating its right
to freedom of expression.
Women on Waves first raised its right to freedom of expression within the
legal system of the European Community, in a legal battle with Portugal following
escalated tensions between the nonprofit and the coastal state. On August 27,
2004, Women on Waves’ ship, the Borndiep, entered the Portuguese harbor of
Figueira da Foz and requested permission to dock. 122 When the harbormaster
refused, Women on Waves faxed an official request to the Portuguese
government, which in turn denied the request. 123 Portugal’s far-right Minister of
Defense Paulo Portas defended Portugal’s response by claiming that the ship was
a threat to national security. 124 The next day, the Portuguese government sent out
118

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 25, at art. 19.

119

ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 19(2).
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10(2), Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
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See id. at art. 11(2).
Requesting Permission to Enter the Harbor of Figueira da Foz, WOMEN ON WAVES: THE PORTUGUESE
DIARY (Aug. 27, 2004), http://perma.cc/8ZLR-RWY4.
Id.
Entry Ship Denied, WOMEN ON WAVES: THE PORTUGUESE DIARY (Aug. 28, 2004),
http://perma.cc/5BKD-8MQQ.
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two warships to ensure the Borndiep did not cross into national waters. 125 Harbor
authorities continued to refuse to allow the ship to enter the port, even for the
purposes of refueling. 126
Women on Waves, along with two Portuguese associations (Clube Safo and
Não te Prives), attempted to sue Portugal in national courts. On the morning of
September 6, the Administrative and Fiscal Court of Coimbra heard the case. The
organizations’ lawyers argued that the Portuguese government had violated their
freedom of movement, information, and expression. 127 They maintained that
Portugal, in refusing to allow the Borndiep to dock, prevented Women on Waves
from imparting ideas and information, and also prevented Women on Waves from
engaging in symbolic activity. Late in the evening of the same day, the judge read
her verdict, which maintained that it was within the discretion of the Minister of
Defense to prohibit Women on Waves from docking. On September 9, the
Borndiep headed back to the Netherlands after more than two weeks of sitting in
international waters outside of Portugal’s territorial waters. 128
Following their failed attempt in the Portuguese judicial system, Women on
Waves and the two other plaintiffs brought the case to the ECtHR. They claimed
Portugal violated their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful meeting and
freedom of association under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR by preventing the
group from sharing ideas and information with Portuguese women. 129 The
Portuguese government maintained that its actions were permissible under
Articles 19 and 25 of the UNCLOS because the ship’s passage would have violated
Portuguese law. Portugal also argued that its actions were legal under Articles
10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR, claiming that Women on Waves posed a threat to
national security, as well as to the country’s “health and morals.” 130
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The ECtHR released its unanimous 131 decision for Women on Waves and Others
v. Portugal 132 on February 3, 2009. 133 The opinion began by stating that there had
been interference with the plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of expression, as Portugal
effectively barred Women on Waves from communicating its message. The key
issue was whether this interference was “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a
democratic society.” 134 The ECtHR maintained that Portugal’s actions were
allowed under UNCLOS Articles 19(2)(g) and 25. This ruling demonstrates that
the ECtHR considers UNCLOS to be controlling law when determining the
legality of certain acts under the European Convention. 135
However, ultimately the ECtHR found that Portugal violated Article 10 of
the ECHR and that its response was disproportionate. The Court held that
Portugal’s acts of interference were not “necessary in a democratic society.” 136 The
ECtHR emphasized that Women on Waves had not trespassed on public or
private property, nor was there strong evidence that Women on Waves intended
to deliberately breach Portugal’s abortion laws. Additionally, the Court noted that
freedom of expression cannot be restricted at all, provided the entity is not
committing reprehensible acts. 137 The decision also highlighted how the extreme
actions of sending warships to international waters may serve to further deter
freedom of expression in general.
Regarding proportionality, the decision noted “the State certainly had at its
disposal other means to attain the legitimate objectives of defending order and
protecting health than to resort to a total interdiction of entry of the Borndiep in its
territorial waters, especially by sending a warship against a merchant vessel.” 138
The Court maintained that the government should have enforced its laws in a
softer manner, such as sequestrating the abortion pills.
In weighing Portugal’s sovereignty against Women on Waves’ right to
expression, the ECtHR stated:
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The Court does not underestimate how important the protection of the
legislation concerning abortion was for the Portuguese State together with
the principles and values that undermined it. But the Court highlights that
presenting shocking ideas contesting the modus operandi makes freedom of
expression more valuable and necessary than ever. 139

Despite the legal victory, Women on Waves did not receive anywhere near
the amount of damages that it requested. The ECtHR rejected Women on Waves’
request for 49,528.38 Euros for the costs of the Borndiep’s trip. 140 However, the
Court did award 2,000 Euros to each plaintiff for moral injury 141 (out of the 5,000
Euros requested 142). The ECtHR also rejected Women on Waves’ requests for
3,309 Euros for legal fees, maintaining that the plaintiffs already received
reasonable support in the amount of less than 1,500 Euros. 143
Regardless of the amount of damages awarded, Women on Waves clearly
considered its campaign in Portugal to be an overwhelming success. The event
garnered extensive press coverage, both across the world and within the state
itself. In Portugal, more than seven hundred local newspaper articles focused on
the story, and multiple TV channels continuously followed the story as it
unfolded. 144 Juventude Socialista, the youth section of Portugal’s Socialist Party,
sailed out to the Borndiep to hold a press conference on the boat. 145 One talk show
even hosted Dr. Gomperts, who explained on live television how to induce
abortion. 146 Women on Waves was also able to operate a hotline for women,
which was inundated with calls following Dr. Gomperts’ appearance on the talk
show.
Roughly two and a half years after Women on Waves attempted to dock in
Portugal, on February 11, 2007, the country voted in a national referendum to
legalize abortion up to ten weeks. President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, a Social
Democrat who had been elected to office one year earlier, ratified the law on April
10. The ECtHR’s decision would not be released for another two years.
Women on Waves had ostensibly already achieved both its short-term and
long-term goals in Portugal by the time of the ECtHR decision, as the ship
campaign attracted widespread attention and possibly contributed to the outcome
139
140
141
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143
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of Portugal’s referendum two years later. Still, the decision was hugely important
for Women on Waves’ future impact in Europe, as well as around the world. The
group has not visited any other European states via boat since the decision
(Women on Waves sailed to Spain in 2008, one year before the decision came
out). However, recent Women on Waves press releases sharply condemn
restrictive abortion laws in Poland. 147 Additionally, Women on Waves has
expanded beyond its traditional ship campaigns to deliver abortion pills via robot
to women in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 148

2. The Inter-American System strongly promotes the right to freedom
of expression.
The impact of Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal may be felt beyond the
continent of Europe, as the ruling of one international human rights court could
influence the decisions of another such court. Like the European Community, the
Inter-American System also recognizes a right to freedom of expression. Article 4
of the American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man states, “Every person
has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and
dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever.” 149 Similarly, the American
Convention states in Article 13 that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers . . . through any . . .
medium of one’s choice.” 150 The agreement further details:
The exercise of [this] right . . . shall not be subject to prior censorship but
shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly
established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals. 151

This language implies that freedom of expression is an essential individual liberty,
which can only be restricted for a pressing public interest. 152 Furthermore, the
emphasis on banning “prior censorship” may imply that, while a subsequent fine
may be acceptable, preemptive action is not.
147
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The OAS has also created a Declaration of Principles of Freedom of
Expression to detail how the rights articulated in Article 13 apply to various forms
of expression. 153 The Declaration highlights the importance of “free circulation of
ideas and opinions” for a strong democratic society. 154 However, the Declaration
mostly focuses on journalist activities, “social communicators,” and
communication media. 155 While Women on Waves may fall into the second
category of “social communicators,” especially with its hotline activities, the
Declaration does not directly address expressive actions beyond direct
communication (such as offering services to locals).
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has a long history of
promoting freedom of expression. In its 1985 advisory opinion, the court stated,
“Freedom of expression constitutes the primary and basic element of the public
order of a democratic society, which is not conceivable without free debate and
the possibility that dissenting voices be fully heard.” 156 It also noted that freedom
of expression is not limited to a particular type of medium, stating, “[F]reedom of
expression . . . cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium is
deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to have them reach as wide an audience
as possible.” 157
In the 1985 decision of Francisco Martorell v. Chile, 158 the IACHR further
elaborated on the importance of dissemination. This case focused on Chile’s
censorship of a book entitled Impunidad diplomatica. In the opinion, the IACHR
explicitly called out the prohibition on entering the country as an illegal prior
restraint, stating,
[T]he decision to ban the entry, circulation and distribution of the book
“Impunidad diplomatica” in Chile violates the right to impart “information
and ideas of all kinds,” a right that Chile is bound to respect as a State party
to the American Convention. In other words, the decision is an unlawful
restriction of the right to freedom of expression, in the form of an act of prior
censorship disallowed by Article 13 of the Convention. 159
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In the 2008 decision of Kimel v. Argentina, 160 the IACHR detailed the specific
requirements that states must meet to limit freedom of expression under Article
13.2. 161 The state must demonstrate that (1) the limit is articulated by a law; (2) the
state has a legitimate interest; (3) the limit on freedom of expression is necessary
to achieve the state interest; and (4) the limit is proportional to the interest. For
the first element, the IACHR specified that the law must “formally and materially”
enumerate the limitation on freedom of expression. 162 The second element,
legitimate interest, must pertain to some sort of goal listed in the American
Convention itself. For the third element, the government must consider all
possible alternatives for achieving the state interest to determine that there is not
a less restrictive means for achieving the purpose. Lastly, for the proportionality
element, the IACHR specified that analysis consists of: “i) the degree of
impairment of one of the rights at stake, establishing whether the extent of such
impairment was serious, limited, or moderate; ii) the relevance of the satisfaction
of the opposing right, and iii) whether the satisfaction of the latter justifies the
restriction of the former.” 163 The decision also included a concurring opinion,
which emphasized that criminal law is not an appropriate means for controlling
abuses of the right to freedom of expression. 164
The IACHR often follows similar guidelines to the ECtHR. Most
pertinently, in Article 13, the IACHR adopts the same standard as the ECtHR in
emphasizing that freedom of expression is guaranteed even for ideas that may be
deemed shocking or offensive by the state. 165 Thus, while the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR is not binding on the IACHR, it may serve as persuasive guidance.
Still, the two courts differ from one another markedly in regard to their
comparative force on member states. The ECtHR adheres to the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation. This principle recognizes that states have some discretion
in how they implement an international agreement. 166 Thus, European
160
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Community member states are allowed to account for their unique cultural norms
when applying the ECHR. In contrast, the IACHR does not follow the margin of
appreciation doctrine; each state in the Inter-American System must adhere to the
same standard. 167 The IACHR’s stricter standard indicates that the court may be
even less amenable to arguments pertaining to national morality. As described
earlier, though, both the ECHR and the American Convention expressly state that
freedom of expression is subject to local laws relating to morals, health, and
national security. While the IACHR does not follow the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation, it may put a greater emphasis on the factors that limit the right to
freedom of expression. For instance, the specific elements delineated in Kimel v.
Argentina would require the IACHR to rule that Guatemala’s restrictive abortion
laws embody a legitimate state interest, and that Guatemala’s actions to limit
Women on Waves’ freedom of expression in the name of these laws were both
necessary and proportional.
The two systems also follow different approaches in awarding reparations.
The ECtHR typically can only order “just satisfaction,” which amounts to
monetary reparations, while the IACHR can order injunctive relief. 168 The
IACHR’s ability to issue injunctions is a double-edged sword for Women on
Waves. While the court could order countries to permit Women on Waves’ ships
to enter local harbors, it could also issue an injunction against the group, preventing
Women on Waves from even attempting to dock. Thus, the stakes are much
higher than with ECtHR, especially since Women on Waves is not primarily
concerned with recovering monetary damages.
In conclusion, Women on Waves’ right to freedom of expression may
provide a possible means for the group to defend against the actions of states such
as Guatemala, especially following the ECtHR’s decision in Women on Waves and
Others v. Portugal. Still, while the IACHR has a robust history of protecting freedom
of expression under the American Convention, it has never before weighed this
right directly against countries’ abortion laws. Thus, any lawsuit involves some
level of risk, especially given the possibility of an injunction preventing Women
on Waves from approaching coastal states’ waters. However, there are other
potential legal avenues that the nonprofit could pursue.

B. UNCLOS and the Right to “Innocent Passage”
The UNCLOS offers another option for Women on Waves if it chooses to
pursue legal action against countries that prevent its boats from entering local
ports. UNCLOS is an international treaty, signed in 1982 and entered into force
in 1994, that governs countries’ rights and responsibilities regarding maritime
167
168
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travel, commerce, and use of resources. UNCLOS is widely recognized by most
states, including countries that have prevented Women on Waves’ ships from
docking. Currently, there are 157 signatories and 168 parties to UNCLOS.
Portugal, Guatemala, and Morocco have all ratified UNCLOS (and had ratified it
before the events in their waters occurred). The Netherlands signed UNCLOS on
December 10, 1982 and ratified the agreement on June 28, 1996. Parties have a
range of options when choosing where to settle a UNCLOS dispute. Possible
forums include the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in
Hamburg, Germany (Annex VI of UNCLOS); the International Court of Justice
in the Hague, the Netherlands; ad hoc arbitration (Annex VII); or a “special
arbitral tribunal” (Annex VIII). 169
UNCLOS divides the waters surrounding a coastal state into various zones:
the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), and the high seas. 170 States have the utmost authority within their
internal waters, which are treated the same as land territory. Ports and harbors are
considered to be part of a state’s internal waters. There are two approaches
regarding how coastal states should treat vessels in ports. The absolutist approach
endorses the idea that the state has total control over the ship’s activities. In
contrast, the French modification approach, which is the predominant view
among most states, maintains that states may not exert control over activities that
are related to the ship’s “internal economy.” 171 Under the French rule, a state may
only exercise jurisdiction over a vessel if its activities impact the local state and
threaten the peace of the harbor. Vessel activities that are immune from state
control include wages, collective bargaining, necessary discipline, and crimes
committed aboard. 172
The territorial seas consist of the waters within twelve nautical miles of a
state’s shoreline. UNCLOS provides ships with a right of innocent passage
through a state’s territorial waters. 173 The treaty defines innocent passage in Article
18: “Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a)
traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port
facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a
call at such roadstead or port facility.” 174 Article 19 further specifies that passage
is innocent “so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
169
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the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with . . . other rules
of international law.” 175 In Article 19(2), UNCLOS states that it does not consider
the following activities to be innocent:
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State; . . . (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State; . . . (l) any other activity not having a direct
bearing on passage. 176

UNCLOS itself does not specify whether the activities enumerated in Article 19(2)
are an exhaustive list, but it has been interpreted as such in a bilateral agreement
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 177 Thus, the creation of a limited list
withdraws the ability of the state to use its sole discretion to subjectively determine
non-innocence. The list reflects a desire for global uniformity and a “[c]oncern for
broad, community interests.” 178 Furthermore, scholars highlight that only acts that
occur while the vessel is within the territorial sea should be taken into account
when determining the innocence of the passage: “the coastal State’s subjective
appraisal is limited, restricted objectively by the requirement that the violation
occur while the foreign ship is in passage.” 179
If a passage is not innocent, UNCLOS specifies that “[t]he coastal State may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage.” 180 Furthermore,
a state may arrest a foreign ship that is violating local law in territorial waters. 181
Article 21 allows coastal states to “adopt laws and regulations . . . relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea.” 182 If the parties on a foreign vessel
were to breach these laws (or if a state had reason to believe the parties violated the
law), the state would have the right of hot pursuit. 183 Otherwise, states do not have
authority to pursue or interfere with vessels in any way; Article 24 of UNCLOS
states that “[t]he coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign
ships through the territorial sea.” 184 Article 25 provides states with the explicit
175
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176
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power to take “necessary steps” to stop non-innocent passages. 185 In Women on
Waves and Others v. Portugal, the ECtHR ruled that Articles 19 and 25 provided a
legal basis for Portugal’s decision to send warships out to the Women on Waves’
ship, because if the ship had entered Portuguese territorial waters, it would have
constituted a breach of Portugal’s abortion laws. 186
Beyond the territorial sea lies the contiguous zone, which includes waters
between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles from a state’s shores. Article 33 of
UNCLOS specifies that a state may only exert control over vessels in this zone to
prevent and punish the “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.” 187 Once Women
on Waves’ ship reaches this zone, it has much more freedom to provide services
that may violate the laws of nearby coastal states.
The EEZ is the most expansive area in which a state may exercise
jurisdiction, as it may constitute up to two hundred nautical miles outside of a
state’s territorial waters. In this zone, coastal states have specific, enumerated
rights pertaining to artificial islands, scientific research, and the protection and
preservation of the environment. 188
Lastly, the high seas consist of all waters beyond the EEZ. UNCLOS
strongly emphasizes freedom of the high seas, noting that “[t]hese freedoms shall
be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their
exercise of freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under
this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.” 189 UNCLOS also states
that “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.” 190 In this zone,
Women on Waves is totally free to conduct operations as it wishes.
For each zone listed in UNCLOS, vessels should expect countries to adhere
to the jurisdictional boundaries as they best understand them. States have an
obligation to follow all articles of UNCLOS in good faith, 191 and should not
attempt to abuse any of the rights granted in the treaty.
UNCLOS offers an alternative option beyond human rights law for Women
on Waves to pursue. While there is some ambiguity regarding which types of
passages count as innocent for the purposes of Article 17, Women on Waves can
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point to the U.S.-Soviet treaty and a large number of legal scholars as indicators
that its mission should qualify.

V. P OSSIBLE C LAIMS A GAINST G UATEMALA
On its website, Women on Waves states that “all participating activists
agreed that it is very important to continue with the legal battle against the
expulsion of the crew up [sic] the Inter-American court of human rights.” 192
However, the organization has not announced any litigation. This Section will
discuss potential claims under the ICCPR, the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention), and the UNCLOS that Women on Waves could
bring against Guatemala, if it ever chooses to pursue legal action. While Women
on Waves could bring numerous claims based solely on the specific mistreatment
of the ship’s crew by Guatemalan authorities, 193 this Section will focus on broader
courses of action which Women on Waves could possibly pursue in other
scenarios if it were to attempt to visit another Latin American country.

A. Actions Based on Guatemalan Women’s Rights
Guatemalan women, rather than Women on Waves, could seek relief based
on violations of their human rights.

1. Guatemalan women have procedural rights as a group.
On countless occasions, groups of women have sued their own state to
challenge discriminatory laws. The U.N. permits groups of individuals to bring
complaints under numerous mechanisms, including the 1503 procedure and the
first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. For example, in 1978, nineteen Mauritian
women filed a complaint based on an immigration law preventing foreign
husbands of Mauritian women from becoming de facto citizens. The group of
women used the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 194 which provides
complaint procedures for individuals and groups to submit complaints. The
UNHCR found that the law made an adverse distinction on the grounds of sex,
as the law permitted foreign wives of Mauritian men to become de facto

192
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citizens. 195 Women have used this Optional Protocol on numerous occasions since
the Mauritius case. 196
Within the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Commission may
receive petitions from “any person or group of persons . . . legally recognized in
one or more OAS members states.” 197 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights’ (IACHR) rules stipulate that “[w]hen there are several alleged victims or
representatives, these shall designate a common intervener, who shall be the only
person authorized to present pleadings, motions, and evidence during the
proceedings, including the public hearings.” 198 Furthermore, NGOs may
represent other petitioners. 199 Thus, Women on Waves could serve as the
women’s representative.
Because Guatemala ratified the American Convention, the state is subject to
the IACHR’s jurisdiction in general. State parties must also voluntarily submit to
the IACHR’s jurisdiction for particular cases. However, numerous states,
including Guatemala, have accepted contentious jurisdiction on a blanket basis. 200

2. Guatemalan women could sue Guatemala for violating their
reproductive rights.
Initially, the most obvious option appears to be Guatemalan women
bringing an action based on the precise right that Women on Waves seeks to
protect and promote: the right to an abortion. Within the U.N. system, women
could sue based on a large number of rights related to reproduction. Under the
ICCPR, there is the right to life (Article 6), the prohibition against cruel and
unusual treatment (Article 7), the right to privacy (Article 17), and the prohibition
against discrimination (Article 26). The CEDAW explicitly grants reproductive
rights in Article 16(e). Additionally, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) grants in Article 12 a right to physical and
mental health, which the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) has interpreted to include reproductive rights. In contrast to the U.N.,
the Inter-American System has a much more confined view of reproductive rights.
The American Convention is one of the few international documents to define
the start of life at conception.
195

See Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 Other Mauritian Women v. Mauritius, Communication No.
35/1978, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 (Apr. 9, 1981).

196

See, for example, Examples of Cases Where Women Have Used the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR to
Challenge Sex Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS, http://perma.cc/5XSC-2RXV.

197

Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 23.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 25(2).

198
199

See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, arts. 2(26), 25(1); Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 23.

200

See B-32: American Convention on Human Rights, COMISÍON INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS, http://perma.cc/AWE9-ZDRZ.

130

Vol. 20 No. 1

Navigating Rough Seas

Bisgaier

While U.N. and Inter-American System have vastly different language in
their international agreements pertaining to reproductive rights, their judicial
bodies have made markedly similar decisions about such rights. These governing
bodies have all recognized a woman’s right to an abortion in extreme cases such
as danger to the woman, health problems with the fetus, rape, and/or the young
age of the woman, but are reluctant to apply that right more broadly. The Mellet
case under the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) featured a woman
whose fetus had congenital heart defects. The L.C. case under CEDAW focused
on a thirteen-year-old who was raped. For the Inter-American System, the InterAmerican Commission found (and the IACHR affirmed) in the Baby Boy case
that a doctor should not be criminally liable for aborting a seventeen-year-old’s
fetus.
This precedent is problematic for Women on Waves, because the group does
not target its services and information towards a particular scenario or type of
woman. Guatemala could easily distinguish Women on Waves’ ship campaign
from past cases by emphasizing the group’s outreach towards a wide range of
women. Women on Waves aims to ensure that all women, regardless of health,
background, or circumstance, have access to safe abortions. Therefore, because
enforcement of international reproductive rights is still largely limited to
therapeutic abortions and other extreme circumstances, Women on Waves’ legal
efforts should focus on other human rights.

3. Guatemalan women could sue Guatemala for violating their right to
access information.
Guatemalan women could bring an action against Guatemala either before
the UNHCR for violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR, or before the IACHR for
violation of Article 13 of the American Convention. While both of these
provisions focus on freedom of expression, they either explicitly or implicitly
include the right to freedom of access of information as well. 201 Focusing on the
right to access information would not help Women on Waves in its campaign to
provide abortion services to women. However, a major component of the group’s
mission is to empower women by providing them with information on how to
induce abortion themselves with the drug misoprostol. Thus, the right to access
information serves as useful means for Women on Waves to achieve this goal.
This claim is probably the strongest of the three options. If the women bring
their claim before the UNHCR, they have the advantage of pointing to the precise
language of the ICCPR, which highlights the freedom to “seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 202
201
202

See ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 19(2); Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 91, at ¶ 31.
ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 19(2).
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Furthermore, the precedent set by the Mellet case, which links this right to
reproductive rights, provides an additional benefit. Guatemala may argue that
Mellet featured a woman who faced severe health problems, while Women on
Waves would provide abortion services and information to a range of women,
some of whom would likely be perfectly healthy. Women on Waves could respond
by highlighting how the right to access information is intrinsically connected to
the right to freedom of expression, a right that some international bodies have
considered to be superior to countries’ authority to determine morality norms, as
demonstrated by Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal.
The IACHR, in contrast, does not have an explicit right or such on-point
caselaw. However, this court has a long history of recognizing the right to access
information as inextricably linked to the right to freedom of expression.
Guatemala may argue that its actions were “necessary to ensure . . . the protection
of national security, public order, or public health or morals.” 203 Women on Waves
could respond that preventing information from even reaching the women
constitutes “prior censorship,” and is therefore banned under the American
Convention. 204 There are only two instances in which a prior restraint is acceptable
under the American Convention: 1) regulating access to public entertainments to
ensure the “moral protection of childhood and adolescence;” 205 and 2) suspending
the right to freedom of expression “[i]n a time of war, public danger, or other
emergency.” 206
Guatemala may claim that regulating Women on Waves’ information is
necessary to preserve the moral sensibilities of its children. However, this
argument falls short for two reasons. First, while Women on Waves certainly is
hoping to reach all women who need its resources—including adolescents under
the age of eighteen—children are not the only recipients of its information.
Therefore, a ban on all resources solely for the purpose of protecting children
would be exceedingly overbroad. Second, the American Convention specifies
“public entertainments.” 207 Women on Waves’ resources are purely didactic in
nature and do not qualify as entertainment.
Guatemala could also argue that Women on Waves’ attempts to subvert its
restrictive abortion laws count as a public danger or emergency. However, the
group hardly qualifies as a grave danger to the state’s “independence or security,”
as the provision requires. 208 Furthermore, that same provision stipulates that any
203
204
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208

American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 13(2)(b).
Id. at art. 13(2).
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suspension of rights must “not involve discrimination on the ground of . . .
sex.” 209 Any state regulation focused on suppression of information pertaining to
abortion clearly impacts one gender disproportionately.
Ultimately, the IACHR’s decision on this sort of claim would hinge on
whether the court determines women’s rights under Article 13 to be more
significant than Guatemala’s ability to promote its own moral norms. The
UNHCR would probably provide a friendlier forum, based on its previous ruling
in the Mellet case. If the UNHCR were to expand its holding in Mellet and rule that
all women seeking abortions have a right to access information (as opposed to just
women seeking therapeutic abortions for their own health), it would be a major
victory for Women on Waves, as well as the international reproductive rights
movements in general.

4. Guatemalan women could sue Guatemala for violating their right
to leave.
Another option for Guatemalan women is suing their state for violating their
right to freedom of mobility, either under Article 12(2) of the ICCPR or Article
22(2) of the American Convention. Unlike Article 13 of the Convention, Article
22(2) does not contain any references to permissible ex-post impositions of liability
on the state’s part. Guatemala may contend that it never physically stopped
women from leaving or inhibited their travel in any way. However, Women on
Waves could respond that Guatemala’s decision to block the harbor effectively
prevented any women from boarding the ship, and thus restricted their right to
total mobility.
Most UNHRC precedent regarding the right to leave focuses on terrorist
activity, political dissidents, and military service, so it is difficult to predict how
the Committee would rule on a situation where women’s rights to temporarily
leave their country conflict with that country’s perspective on public morals.
Regardless, one major flaw with focusing on this claim is that it depends on
Women on Waves’ ship being able to dock in the first place so that the women
can physically access the boat. If countries preemptively stop the boat from
accessing a local port, as Portugal did in 2004, women would not be able to leave
the country. Women on Waves could attempt to create some sort of tugboat
system to transport women to and from the boat, but that approach would require
significant coordination and cooperation from locals. In Portugal, Women on
Waves briefly tried to set up a tugboat system, but local ships were unwilling to
bring women out to the Borndiep out of fear of getting arrested. 210 Therefore, the
right to access information is probably a superior option for local women to
pursue.
209
210
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B. Actions Based on Women on Waves’ Rights
Women on Waves could choose to follow a path similar to what it did in
Portugal and sue Guatemala for violating its human rights and/or its rights under
the law of the sea. Women on Waves was able to prevail in its case against
Portugal, so it has a possible roadmap going forward. However, clearly Women
on Waves cannot bring an action against Guatemala before the ECtHR, because
Guatemala is not a member state of the European Community. Thus, as the forum
will differ, the group may need to adjust its strategy. Because the American
Convention defines life as beginning at conception, Women on Waves’ best
options are either bringing a human rights claim before a U.N. body, or bringing
a UNCLOS claim before an alternative forum such as the ITLOS or the
International Court of Justice.

1. NGOs have procedural rights to sue states.
Under the U.N., anyone—including individuals, states, and NGOs—may
bring a complaint before the UNHRC under the 1503 procedure (the U.N.’s
complaint procedure). 211 The U.N. fact sheet stipulates that NGOs must act in
“good faith” and provide “reliable direct evidence.” 212
Within the Inter-American System, NGOs need to file a petition with the
Inter-American Commission for their complaints to be heard by the IACHR. 213
NGOs do not need to be recognized by the member state that they are bringing
a claim against; the NGO must simply be recognized by any member state. 214

2. Women on Waves could sue Guatemala for violating its right to
freedom of expression.
As it did with Portugal in 2004, Women on Waves could bring an action
against Guatemala based on a violation of its right to freedom of expression.
Guatemala may invoke arguments similar to those detailed in Section V.A.2
pertaining to national security and public health.
Guatemala could argue that its actions meet the four requirements detailed
in Kimel v. Argentina for state limitations of freedom of expression. First, the
limitation is clearly based on state law. 215 Second, Guatemala could maintain that
211
212
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214
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See Fact Sheet No. 7/ Rev. 1, Complaints Procedure, OHCHR 15.
Id.
See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 44.
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions,
36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 919 (2011).
Guatemala’s constitution specifies that life begins at conception. Guat. Const. Title II Ch. I art. 3.
Abortion was illegal under all circumstances until 1973, when the penal code was amended to permit
abortion in cases that endangered the woman’s life. Guat. Cong. Decree 17-73.
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it has a legitimate interest in protecting the lives of unborn children. Women on
Waves could argue that this decision should be entirely up to the woman, and the
state has no legitimate basis for interfering. However, because both the American
Convention and Guatemala’s constitution state that life begins at conception, this
would be an uphill battle. 216 Third, Guatemala could contend that limiting Women
on Waves’ freedom of expression is necessary to advance its state interest.
However, there are alternative ways to achieve this interest without directly
attacking expression, such as monitoring the sale of misoprostol and mifepristone
(the drugs used to self-induce abortion). Of course, Women on Waves would not
be happy with any alternatives, as Guatemala’s interest directly conflicts with the
group’s objectives. Fourth, Guatemala could claim that its actions were
proportionate to the interest. Women on Waves could respond that its rights to
freedom of expression were impaired to a significant degree; the group could not
even dock in local waters to express itself.
The outcome of Guatemala’s defense may hinge on how far the IACHR is
willing to extend Kimel v. Argentina. Kimel featured a clear-cut case of abuse of
freedom of the press: Argentina imprisoned a journalist who was critical of the
state’s investigation of a massacre during its military dictatorship. 217 Women on
Waves is not a news organization aiming to uncover the truth; it is an NGO with
a very specific agenda. However, the IACHR may be hesitant to draw lines
regarding which organizations are worthy of Article 13 protection. 218
Guatemala may also contend that recognizing Women on Waves’ right to
expression would threaten its moral sovereignty. Women on Waves could respond
by pointing to Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal in the ECtHR, and noting
that—unlike the ECtHR—the IACHR does not follow the doctrine of margin of
appreciation and thus does not account for states’ individual standards pertaining
to morality. 219 However, the American Convention also states that life begins at
216
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conception, 220 putting Women on Waves’ right to freedom of expression in direct
conflict with the right to life, as defined by the agreement. Furthermore, the
IACHR may be more sympathetic to Guatemala’s moral views and consider them
as largely reflective of the region as a whole. Thus, while the court does not follow
the margin of appreciation doctrine, it may not need to in order to find that
Guatemala is justified in limiting the group’s right to freedom of expression.
Because the entire Inter-American region strongly favors pro-life views, Women
on Waves should either bring its freedom of expression claim before the UNHRC,
or instead bring a law of the sea claim before an alternative forum.

3. Women on Waves could sue Guatemala for violating its right to
innocent passage.
Women on Waves could choose to focus on the law of the sea, rather than
human rights, and sue Guatemala for violating its right to innocent passage under
UNCLOS. The first issue in bringing a UNCLOS claim is determining where to
settle the dispute. As discussed earlier, UNCLOS provides for a wide array of
forum options. 221 If the parties’ choice of forum does not match, or if one of the
parties fails to make a choice, an arbitral tribunal hears the dispute in accordance
with Annex VII.
Beyond forum choice, in dealing with the law of the sea, there are five widely
recognized bases for jurisdiction that Guatemala may invoke. 222 First, the
territorial principle maintains that states have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce
their laws and regulations within their borders. Second, the nationality principle
(also known as the active personality principle) contends that a state may assert
jurisdiction over its nationals, no matter where their actions take place. Third, the
passive personality principle puts forth the idea that states are authorized to
exercise jurisdiction over any place where offenses are committed against victims
who are nationals. Fourth, the protective principle maintains that a state may
assume jurisdiction over harmful conduct that has serious consequences for the
state. And lastly, the universal principle asserts that states may claim jurisdiction
over criminals who commit particularly terrible crimes, such as war crimes,
genocide, and terrorism.
Guatemala could invoke several of these principles in attempting to
demonstrate that Women on Waves’ passage is not innocent. However,
Guatemala would first either need to demonstrate either (1) that the activities
listed in Article 19(2) are not exhaustive; or (2) that Women on Waves’ actions fall
within one of the activities listed in Article 19(2).
220

See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, at art. 4.

221

See Section IV.B, supra.
See Wolf, supra note 12, at 114–16.

222

136

Vol. 20 No. 1

Navigating Rough Seas

Bisgaier

Regarding the first option, Guatemala could highlight how Article 19(2)(l)
states that “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage” demonstrates
non-innocence. 223 While this provision is rather vague and open-ended, it seems
to at least suggest that the list of activities in Article 19(2) is not exhaustive.
However, because both scholars and U.N. history point to a consensus that the
list of activities is meant to be exclusive, Guatemala’s better option would be trying
to demonstrate that Women on Waves is performing one of the activities already
listed in Articles 19(2)(a)–(k).
Guatemala may claim that Women on Waves’ mission represents a threat to
defense and national security, and therefore—under the protective principle—it
is protecting its own nationals against a grave outside threat. 224 Women on Waves
could argue that its services do not conflict with traditional national interests, such
as security, treasury, or government functions. Rather, the group provides
information and services to nationals who seek them. Guatemala may instead
argue that—under the passive personality principle—it may exercise jurisdiction
over Women on Waves, as it protects unborn Guatemalan nationals. In that case,
Women on Waves could contend that, because it is operating a Dutch ship, flag
state jurisdiction applies on the high seas. Thus, Dutch law applies, which does
not recognize life as beginning at conception. 225 Finally, Guatemala could argue
that—under the universal principle—it has authority to prevent heinous crimes.
However, abortion has never been universally recognized as such an offense on
par with crimes like terrorism and genocide. 226 Thus, this defense likely would not
carry much weight.
Guatemala may also choose to focus on Article 19(2)(g), which maintains
that the “loading or unloading of any commodity . . . or person contrary to the . . .
laws and regulations of the coastal State” on the part of a foreign ship makes the
ship’s passage non-innocent. 227 Guatemala may contend that, under the nationality
(or active personality) principle, it has the authority to assert jurisdiction over
Guatemalan passengers and prevent them from boarding. Women on Waves
could respond by emphasizing that Guatemalan women have a right to freedom
of movement, as described above. 228
223
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Additionally, Guatemala may assert that Women on Waves is abusing
freedom of the high seas under Article 300, which requires “good faith.” 229
Women on Waves could respond by highlighting that freedom of the high seas is
expansive, and the group is providing what it considers to be a universal human
right to the state’s women.
Ultimately, the issue of innocent passage comes down to questions of
ambiguity. Does a ship make an innocent passage when it aims to dock on a
country’s harbor, board citizens, and then take those citizens to international
waters and perform actions that are illegal in that country? Does a ship make an
innocent passage when it aims to publicize information about a practice that is illegal
in the country? The ECtHR determined in Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal
that Women on Waves did not have a claim based on its right to innocent passage.
However, the ECtHR ultimately does not have jurisdiction over UNCLOS claims;
a different forum may come to the opposite conclusion. Women on Waves would
highlight the emerging view that “human rights concerns are . . . inextricably
intertwined with the concerns of the Law of the Sea.” 230 ITLOS, for example, has
a history of interpreting UNCLOS provisions to benefit individual ships and their
crew over the state. 231 Forums such as the International Court of Justice do not
need to adopt the perspective of the specific treaty under which the case is
submitted to, 232 and thus may be even more amenable than ITLOS to considering
human rights principles in addition to UNCLOS provisions. Still, Guatemala
would be quick to point to the ECtHR decision as proof that even courts that
specialize in human rights may not be swayed to interpret “innocent passage” in
favor of Women on Waves.

VI. C ONCLUSION
Women on Waves has not announced plans to visit more Latin American
coastal states in the near future (its most recent press release focused on Northern
Ireland). 233 However, given the vast amount of restrictive abortion laws in the
region, a future visit is highly likely.
When states such as Guatemala take action to prevent Women on Waves
either from directly providing services for nationals, or from communicating
information via apps, hotlines, and its website, legal action is one of the best
229
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Treves, supra note 129, at 13–14.
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options for the group. While Women on Waves’ ship campaigns aim to provide
information and abortion services to women, Women on Waves also has the
secondary goal of highlighting the problems of women in countries with restrictive
abortion laws. Thus, countries’ attempts to restrict Women on Waves’ ships, and
the lawsuits that follow, may ironically be more useful in achieving Women on
Waves’ second goal than if the countries passively permitted Women on Waves
to dock. Still, it is key that Women on Waves has the capacity to—at the very
least—attempt to reach the shores of coastal states (an injunction would be a drastic
blow to Women on Waves’ mission). Furthermore, Women on Waves still also
hopes to help the individual women of each country it chooses to visit, through
access to information and/or services.
If Women on Waves decides to bring a suit on behalf of Guatemalan
women, a right to access information claim is probably the best option.
Reproductive rights are still largely recognized only within the context of other
rights, especially if the case does not feature an extreme situation. Even the more
liberal bodies in the U.N. have yet to rule on cases featuring non-therapeutic
abortions. A right to leave claim would raise similar ambiguity problems, as no
court has ever ruled on mobility rights in this particular scenario. Furthermore,
that claim would depend on Women on Waves’ boat getting to a port so that
women have the option to leave.
Women on Waves may prefer to sue on behalf of itself, rather than local
women, to circumvent procedural and safety issues. While NGOs have the
capacity to represent groups of individuals, the claim would involve an additional
procedural hurdle to get through. Furthermore, local women may be unwilling to
bring a case out of fear of their community’s backlash. If Women on Waves brings
its own claim, its best options are either bringing an Article 19 freedom of
expression claim before the UNHRC, or bringing an innocent passage claim
before the ITLOS or the International Court of Justice. Despite the outcome in
Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, a case before the IACHR would be risky
considering the American Convention’s definition of life and the entire region’s
pro-life tendencies.
Regardless of the type of claim brought, if Women on Waves chooses to sue
Guatemala (or another coastal state in Latin America at some point in the future)
in the IACHR, the UNHRC, or another forum, the organization will almost
certainly be able to raise its profile, while simultaneously opening the possibility
of collecting monetary damages and an injunction against the state. However, on
that same note, because the IACHR—unlike the ECtHR—may order injunctive
relief that could impact Women on Waves’ ability both to make headline-worthy
trips and to provide local women with information or services. 234 Women on
Waves should proceed with caution when choosing a forum. Paradoxically, while
234
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Women on Waves aims to promote global reproductive rights, focusing on other
rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of travel, and the right to innocent
passage may better serve the group in ultimately fulfilling its mission.
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